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HOLD THE TILLER FIRM:
ON METHOD AND THE UNIT
OF ANALYSIS
Immanuel Wallerstein
Historical/social analysis is like sailing a boat in rough waters. The
dangers come from all sides. It requires not merely good judgment, but the
ability and the will to hold the tiller firm. When I first started writing The
Modern World-System in 1970, I thought the issue was primarily substantive,
that is, that I was entering into a debate about what is the most useful
interpretation of what happened historically. World-systems analysis was
for me a set of protests against prevailing modes of interpretation, at first
primarily against modernization theory (see Wallerstein, 1979). But I soon
came to see that, in order to arrive at a useful interpretation of what happened
historically, one had to dispose of a useful method. And that has turned out
to be not merely an even more controversial matter than the question of the
substantive interpretation of historical reality, but a more slippery one as
well.
In my venture into worrying about method, I decided that one key issue
was the "unit of analysis," which is why one speaks of "world-systems
analysis." The assumption is that the appropriate unit of analysis is a worldsystem, by which I at least originally meant something other than the modern
nation-state, something larger than this nation-state, and something that was
defined by the boundaries of an effective, ongoing division of labor. Hence
I started with spatial or geographic concerns. The basic metaphor of
core/periphery is in origin and etymology a spatial metaphor.
But as I proceeded, it seemed to me that space could never be separated
analytically from time, and that the unit of which we were talking was
therefore one kind of TimeSpace (see Wallerstein, 1991), specifically that
which I denoted as structural TimeSpace. To give it a language of easy
reference, I thought of structural TimeSpace as divided into "historical
systems." I liked the term because it caught what I thought of as the essential
tension of structural TimeSpace, that it is a system (meaning it has continuing
rules of relation/process, and therefore contains cyclical rhythms) but that
it is also historical (meaning that it is different at every moment, and therefore
contains secular trends). By combining in one concept both cyclical rhythms
and secular trends, I was clearly using an organic analogy. An historical
system has a life: it is born or generated, it lives or proceeds, it dies or
disintegrates. Each of these three moments of the organism can be analyzed
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and located in TimeSpace.
From its institutional outset, what came to be called in the nineteenth
century the "social sciences" was beset by a Methodenstreit. The classical
formulation of this methodological debate was posed in terms of two
alternative epistemologies. On the one hand, there were those who believed
that the object of research was the discerning of general laws of human
behavior, true of all time and space. Their avowed model was to imitate the
methods of classical physics to the degree possible and thereby replicate its
scientific (and social) success. Windelband called this the nomothetic
method, and its proponents became dominant in the emerging university
"disciplines" of cconomics, sociology, and political science. On the other
hand, there were those who believed that the search for general laws was
not merely futile but dangerous, in that it pushed scholars away from what
this group saw as their primary task: ascertaining empirical reality, which
was always particular, indeed idiosyncratic. What really happened, in the
famous phrase of Ranke, could indeed be discerned and, once discerned,
empathetically reconstructed. This was called the idiographic method, and
its proponents hecame dominant in history and for the most part in
anthropology.
This difference between nomothetic and idiographic, between
synchronic and diachronic, between objective and subjective, between
structure and agency, has been renewed and rediscussed under many labels
and in many avatars. While the organizational linkages of epistemology and
specific disciplines largely reflected university realities between say 1880
and 1945, it has tcnded to break down since then, particularly since the 1970s.
That is to say, the debate is still there, but the persons on each side are not
so easily recognizable by the name of the university department in which
they teach.
Of course, this debate was seldom crude. From its subtleties emerged
not two but a thousand positions. Nonetheless, the cleavage was profound.
Furthermore, there were always schools of thought which specifically refused
the terms of the debate, and suggested either that the dilemma was false, or
that the correct position was an intermediate one or one proceeding from an
Aufhebung. This group was always a numerical minority, if a vocal one. I
count myself among them, and I have called this conducting a "war on two
fronts" (Wallerstein, 1980).
In the period since 1945, there have been a growing number of scholars
who became unhappy with Establishment social science (including of course
history) on the grounds that its methodological imperatives (whether they
were nomothetists or idiographers) had pushed them de facto into the study
of the infinitely small in time and space, and that thereby the problems, the
realities oflarge-scale, long-term social change had become eliminated from
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the purview of scholarship. There was a call for intellectual renewal, and
for new (actually revived) foci of analysis. This call had many names:
dependency theory, ci vilizational analysis, world history, world-systems
analysis, historical sociology, long-run economics, international political
economy, and still others. The list is long. Let me call this the family of
dissidents, in the sense that they all were dissenting from the views that had
dominated, still largely dominate, the universitics.
The seas are rough in two senses. Historical/social real ity is enormously
complex. Indeed, it represents the most complex of all realities. And we
know so little still. But the seas are rough in another sense. The study of
historical/social reality is a highly sensiti ve subject, which has immense
consequerlces for the existing structures of power in our existing worldsystem. Hence, the analyses are closely surveyed, pressured, and kept in
check. The Establishment views are not only wrong; they are powerfully
protected by extra-intellectual means. If we are to procecd in such rough
seas, we must hold the tiller firm, and in particular we mu~t not fall prey to
the temptations of the world, which are primarily three: to become
nomothetic, to become idiographic, to reity. I see very many persons in the
family of dissidents paying, in my view, insufficient attention to these
dangers. I shall discuss each in turn.
THE NOMOTHETIC TEMPTATION

Since all explanation is ultimately in terms of a covering law, however
implicit and even if specifically denied, it is tempting to wish to make the
covering laws we use as general and as simple as possible. But, of course,
there is a price to be paid for generalizing our laws. The more general, the
more different things they explain, but the fewer aspects they explain about
each thing. It depends on what we want to have explained. For most things,
if we use too general a law, the explanation is vacuous, and if we use too
narrow a generalization, the explanation is specious. So there is a pragmatic
judgment to be made, in terms of payoff. We need to do constant, if not
always explicit, cost-benefit analyses.
In world-systems analysis, Christopher Chase-Dunn and others have
put to themselves a very simple, obvious proposition. If our unit of analysis
is a world-system, and if there are several kinds of world-systems (not an
enormous number, but more than one), would it not be u'ieful to compare
the three or four or five kinds of world-systems with each other, to discern
their similarities and differences, and thercfore to arrive at more general
explanations of the functioning of world-systems? This is a nomothetic
temptation. Chase-Dunn has put his case this way:
The world-systems perspective has expanded the temporal and
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spatial scope of theorizing about social change. Our understanding of
modernity has been radically transformed by the study of the Europecentered world-system over the past 500 years. But the analysis of a
single system encounters methodological and theoretical limitations.
If we would fathom fundamental change we need to comprehend the
causes of those structural constants which are usually taken for granted
in the modern world-system. These structural "constants" exhibit
variation when we broaden the scope of comparison to include very
different kinds of world-systems. Are interstate systems of
core/periphery hierarchies inevitable features of all organizational
wholes')

Do all

world-systems

share a similar underlying

developmental logic, or do systemic logics undergo fundamental
transformations? These questions can only be scientifically addressed
by a comparative perspective which employs the corpus of evidence
produced by historians, ethnographers, and archaeologists regarding
human activities over very long periods of time much longer than the
five hundred year span of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn,
1992:311).

Hence, Chase-Dunn is ready to compare the "world-system" of Cahokia
within the middle Mississippian tradition with Mesopotamia and with the
modern capitalist world-system. To do this, he adds that "concepts developed
for the analysis of the modern system be applied with care; some of them
need to be redefined in order to avoid projecting contemporary reality on
the past."
This may work, but I remain skeptical. One of the major reasons I
remain skeptical is that I wonder if one can take a set of concepts developed
for the analysis of one historical system, consider the concepts one by one,
redefine each in some more general form (of which consequently the form
in the modern world-system becomes but one variant), and then recombine
them for the analysis of Cahokia or Mesopotamia. This presumes a certain
independence of the concepts from each other which, it seems to me, is
doubtful. To be specific, the concept "core/periphery" is not analytically
dissociable from the concept "class contlict" or the concept "interstate
system" or the concept "endless accumulation of capital." That is to say, the
set of concepts developed for a fruitful analysis of the modern world-system
is a set. Dissociated, redefined (in the sense of giving different values to
each), and reassembled, they may have the coherence of an awkwardly
patched pottery bowl.
There are no doubt similarities one can find between Cahokia, as an
example of a stateless, classless (?) structure; Mesopotamia, as an example
of a world-empire (if that is what it was); and the modern world-system, as
an example of a capitalist world-economy. But are these similarities and
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therefore the differences analytically interesting for problems we wish to
solve? There might be some, but looking at these problems does not seem
to be the line the "comparative study of world-systems" has been following.
The work up to now has emphasized the comparison of the rules governing
the system, which I would call looking at the ongoing lives of the systems.
Here, I think we are comparing apples and oranges, and I don't think we'll
get much further than saying they're both fruit and not vegetables.
What might possibly be a fruitful line of enquiry is to compare both
the geneses and the terminal crises of systems, to sec if there are any patterns,
which could then (a) give us some insight into "world history," if by that
we mean the synchronic unfolding of human social existence, and (b)
illuminattc how system bifurcations (vide Prigogine) w()rk in historical
systems, which in turn might help us with (c) the practical question of how
best to navigate the current bifurcation (or systemic demise, or transformation
from one historical system to one or more other such systems).
I have said that where we draw the line in our work in this
nomothetic/idiographic divide (or intrinsic tension) is a pragmatic matter,
and I have suggested reasons to believe that the "comparati ve study of worldsystems" is not where I would place my bets in terms of useful interpretations.
But of course I may be wrong. I would feel more comfortable about this line
of work if its practitioners were more cautious about the nomothetic
temptation.
THE IDIOGRAPHIC TEMPTATION

In the same article cited above, Chase-Dunn critici/es two extremes
on a continuum, what he calls the "Iumpers" and the "splitters." "The extreme
lumpers are those who see only one global system far back in time ....
Extreme splitters are those who focus only on local processcs to the exclusion
of more distant connections" (1992:317). He comes out sensibly for an inbetween position. But the way he puts it, the story is not quite clear. One of
his extremes is temporal (too much time), and the other is spatial (too local).
Of course, both are in reality spatio-temporal. Most important of all, the two
"extremes" are in fact only one: they are both forms of the idiographic
temptation. To say that everything is one single thing, or to say that every
"unit" is local, that is, different from all the other units, are both ways to
avoid structural explanation. In one case, there can be no variation and
therefore no alternative structures; in the other, there is nothing but variation,
and no two things can be lumped together as structures.
We readily recognize in localism a familiar particularizing face, the
standard undergirding of idiographic analysis. Presumably. the dissidents of
whom I spoke above have all been allergic to such self-defeating localism.
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But one big single story is just another form of the idiographic temptation,
and this is the route Andre Gunder Frank has chosen to take in his recent
writings about "world system history":
I now also stress and examine "systemic connections in a single
historical process" extending back much earlier than 1500. I now
examine these systemic connections in a single historical process over
a much wider social and geographical range, including at least the
entire Afro-Eurasian ecumene, of which Europe and its world is only
a part. Thus the historical and socio-geographical scope of this process
is no longer seen as beginning and centered in Europe, which, on the
contrary. joined it rather late. I will also question the supposed
historical uniqueness and perhaps the social-theoretical relevance of
the modem capitalist mode of production (Frank, 1990: 164).

This is not the place to review Frank's version of the evolution of world
history. Here we are only raising methodological doubts. Everything that
can be denoted as a system can be shown to be "open" at some points of its
perimeter. One can always take this opening and insist that the presumed
system is really part of some larger system. It will not take long to arrive at
the largest of all possible systems, the universe from the beginning of its
existence to now. Whether even this supersystem is open is itself a matter
of philosophical and scientific debate. And in this sense everything is
determined by the big bang, if there was a big bang. But while it is salutary
to remember this, it is not very useful to build our analysis on this quicksand,
which will very rapidly engulf us. Once again, the question is pragmatic.
Frank says the story does not start in AD 1500, but rather in 3000 Be
(or so). Perhaps, but by what logic do we stop at 3000 Be? Why not 10,000
Be? Why not go back to Australopithecus, or to prehominids? Once again,
it depends on what question we want to answer. And that depends on your
chronosophy (Pomian, 1979). If you think the history of the world has been
a linear upward curve, then it is very important to pursue Frank's line of
argument. It is explicitly aimed at uhdermining a Eurocentric reading of
world progress. Basically, it says that the Europeans, whether circa 1800 or
circa 1500, did nothing special. They were a part, a "rather late" part of the
story of humanity'S achievements. This is the salutary message Frank bears.
And I sympathize with it, except that I do not think that the history of the
world has been a linear upward curve. I think, to put it crudely, that the curve
essentially went up with the so-called agricultural revolution (despite its
social negatives), then essentially went down with the arrival of a capitalist
world-system (despite some pluses which have been much exaggerated), and
may go up again (but then again may not) with the future demise of the world
capitalist system. If this chronosophy is adopted, then it positively impedes
clarity of vision to efface the 1500 line. Rather we must exert much more
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energy than we have up to now on the question of genesis - what it was
about the situation of the Europeans that accounts for their taking this major,
backward step (see Wallerstein, 1992). And we need to spend much time as
well on the question of bifurcation, demise and/or transition, which may
require a comparative look (along the lines I suggested in my discussion of
Chase-Dunn).
It is always easy, as I said, to find generalizations that are plausible (if
often not very interesting). It is always possible to insist that every particular
situation is different from every other in some way, and that therefore all
the generalizations are false. And it is always easy to prove continuity of a
single reality, in that there are always some things which do not seem to
have changed. In any case, there are no caesuras in history that are vacuums,
or unbridgeable chasms. The world goes on, microsecond by microsecond.
The hard thing is to find the appropriate balance, and to be certain that it is
the most relevant balance for the question you wish to answer.
THE TEMPTATION TO REIFY

Analysts do not manipulate data, though many of them like to think
that is what they are doing. Rather, analysts manipulate concepts. Concepts
become our friends, even our children. They take on a certain life of their
own, and it is tempting to stretch their usage beyond the purpose for which
they were created. This is what reification is about. In the context of the
study of long-term, large-scale social change, one of the concepts most
frequently and lovingly employed is that of civilization. Indeed, most of us
have a fairly standard list in mind when we use the word: the West (or
Christianity), perhaps Russia (or maybe the whole Orthodox world), Islam
(or the Arabo-Islamic world), Persia, India, China, perhaps Japan and Korea
separate from the Sinic world, and then the ones no longer surviving:
Byzantium, Mesopotamia, the Incas, Pharaonic Egypt, classical Antiquity
(or are Rome and Greece separate?), and so forth. Are there African
civilization~, or one African civilization? The list is of course open to
amendment, but that is beside the point. It is a somewhat limited list, usually
20 or 30 examples at most.
What is a "civilization?" It is hard to say because different analysts use
different criteria. For most analysts, it usually involves a linguistic element,
a religious (or cosmological) element, a distinctive pattern of "everyday
life," a spatial locus (however blurred or shifting) and therefore perhaps an
ecological element, and perhaps least convincingly continuous ethnicity and
some genetic coherence. This list too could go on. If one looks at the names
listed above, the one that appears to have the longest continuous history is,
by common accord, China. We talk of a Chinese civilization that presumably
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994
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goes back to the earliest dynasty and continues to today. What continuity
does this imply? We can of course find continuities - not perhaps the same
exact language, but mostly (sic!) related ones; not the same religion(s), but
some links between older forms and later ones; not the same patterns of
everyday life, hut some long-lasting peculiarities; more or less the same
geography, provided one is not too fussy about the breadth of the boundaries;
a limited case for ethnic and genetic descendence.
As with the case for a single world history, one can make a case for a
single Chinese history at about the same level of plausibility, or perhaps at
a stronger level. And certainly we can make the case that many/most Chinese
today (Chinese thinkers, Chinese politicians) believe in this continuity and
act in function of this belief. Suppose, however, that someone were to
postulate that China since 1945 or since 1850 is closer overall on a multitude
of measures of social relations to Brazil since 194511850 than it is to the
"China" of the Han dynasty. We could not reject the case out of hand.
Of course, one can avoid the decision by a common sense dismissal of
the issue - in some ways the one, in some ways the other. The question
doesn't thereby disappear. For many purposes, we have to decide whether
it is more profitahle to consider contemporary China and Brazil as two
instances of the same phenomenon (say, very large underdeveloped nations
within the modern world-system or the capitalist world-economy) or to
consider the China of today and Han China as two instances of Chinese
civilization, comparing it then (I suppose) with the Brazil of today descended
from an uncertain something else of 1500 years ago as two instances ofI'm
not sure what (perhaps Christian civilization).
Would it not be more useful if we didn't reify civilizations? One way
to think about China is to think of it as a name linked to a geographical
location in which there existed successive historical systems, which had a
few features in common, and each of which sustained (for a good deal of
the time) myths concerning civilizational continuity. In that case, instead of
China, the civilization, we are perhaps talking empirically of five, six, or
seven different historical systems (each of which could be grist for the
eventual fourfold tables that will derive from the nomothetic temptation).
At least, I wouldn't like to close off this way of viewing "Chinese history"
by a too rapid embrace of "civilizational analysis." (Of course, one can see
why there would be social pressure against adopting such a perspective on
"China" or "the West" or most of the names we use for "civilizations.")
China is no doubt the strongest case for a civilizationalist thesis. It becomes
harder to demonstrate inherent cultural continuities everywhere else. To be
sure, if we narrow our analysis to the scale and scope of a single historical
system, then a "geoculture" is part of its "systemness."
I have discussed the ci vilizational hypothesis under the heading of the
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temptation to reify.1t is of course most frequently a variant of the idiographic
temptation but occasionally a variant of the nomothetic temptation. But
reification as such is a recurring problem because we deal in concepts, and
concepts are inherently ambiguous tools. Civilization is by no means the
only concept we reify, but for the purposes of the analysis of long-term,
large-scale social change, it is the exemplary one.
CONCLUSION
What is there to conclude? I suppose that the scholar should be
intellectually monastic, and resist temptations. But product that I am of
"American civilization," I urge that the resistance be modulated by
pragmatism. I see no other way. The issues are too important that they not
be faced, and they are too urgent to be closed off to analysis by failing to
fight the war on two - indeed on all - fronts at the same time. Above all,
I urge prudence in any haste to shout Eureka!
Binghamton University and Maison des Sciences de I'Homrne
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